



This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 608090.



G-DPS: A Game-theoretical Decision-making Framework for Physical Surveillance Games

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[CIP Workshop](#)

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Agenda



- Introduction
- Game-Theoretic Modeling using Uncertainty
- Decision-Making Framework and Physical Surveillance Games
- Example: Risk of Physical Intrusion in Critical Infrastructure Environment
- Conclusion





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Introduction

- Risk Management Approaches are typically generic and leave degrees of freedom in the „how“ to accomplish individual steps
- Input in each step relies on domain expertise
- Asking experts is occasionally problematic:


3 People asked → 4 opinions told



G-DPS Framework

Uncertainty Modeling

- Suppose we have a random parameter or quantity X to deal with (such as „risk“ for decision making)



- „Average out the randomness“ (talk only about means, not concrete outcomes)
- Simplifies matters, as we are back at familiar numbers
- But burns lot of information
- Work with the full-featured random variable
- Theoretically more involved
- Yet preserves the available information (that is scarce anyway)

Uncertainty in Games

- Game Theory: ...the (natural) model for the non-cooperative competition between the defender and the adversary
- Game Theory in HyRiM:
 - In practice: Play a worst-case game (what is the best defense against any action of the adversary? What are the worst case attack scenarios?)
 - In theory: lift games to abstract spaces of probability distributions, and use stochastic orders for optimization
- In this talk:

Example

 - Two-Player game: Surveillance people (player 1) vs. Intruders (player 2)
 - Outcome: Intruders either get caught or get missed
 - Uncertainty: ...several kinds of...
 - Blind spots of cameras (static surveillance system)
 - Coincidental misses upon location visitations (adversary was „just not seen“)
 - ...



Physical Surveillance Games



Hey! Your Id

Policy?

- Risk-based
- On-demand
- Random
- ...

Here it is! 😊

Here it is! oO

Hey! Your Id
Thank you! 😊

Goal?



- Espionage
- Sabotage
- ...



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G-DPS Framework

Identification of Strategies




HSLF: Higher Security Level First
R : Random

G-DPS Framework

Identification of Goals

- Detection Rate:
 - Number of detected intruders/Total number of intruders (NI)
- Minimum Privacy preservation:
 - Inversely related to the maximum possible disclosure of employees' locations
- Average Caused Damage
 - $\frac{1}{NI} \sum_i \sum_j timeSpent(intruder_i, area_j) \times secLevel(area_j)$
 - where $secLevel(area_j)$ gives the security level of area j
- Maximum Comfort Breach
 - The maximum comfort breach experienced by the employees
- **The multi-objective security game (MOSG): 8 Def. Strategies x 6 Atk. Strategies x 4 goals**






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G-DPS Framework

Assessment of Strategies



- Strategy assessment
 - w.r.t. the identified goals
 - Classical surveys
 - Expert opinions
 - Statistical data
 - Simulation
- Distribution-valued payoff matrix
 - Demo „*Simulation Framework to Assess Physical Surveillance Strategies*“ on Wednesday at 10:00





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
G-DPS Framework

Optimal Defense Strategy



Applying HyRiM R-package

- Optimal defense strategy
 - No single optimal defense precaution
 - The best is a „mix“ of defense measures





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G-DPS Framework


Worst-case Attack Strategy



Applying HyRiM R-package

- Worst-case attack strategy

- No single adversarial plan causes maximal loss in all goals
- Real losses (in all goals) are **less** than predicted by the game






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G-DPS Framework

Validation



Conclusion

- Risk management in critical infrastructure involves maintaining a high level of situational awareness by means of surveillance and on-site observation.
- The challenge: resource allocation decisions
 - Uncertainty
 - Multiple competing goals
- Therefore, HyRiM approach delivers a tailored framework for game theory that allows:
 - playing games towards risk minimization over stochastic orders, and
 - optimizing over different goals (e.g., damage caused by the adversary, costs for security measures, acceptance of the security measures by the end-users, etc.)



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Thank you for your attention

Questions?



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